INTRODUCTION
The year 2016 saw a radical break from the free-market norms that have, to an increasing extent, marked international procurement markets since World War II. In both the United Kingdom, with the Brexit referendum (discussed in an accompanying piece by Michael Bowsher QC), and in the United States with the election of Donald Trump, major electoral shifts meant that international trade in procurement may well face new barriers in the coming years. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith, The Implications of Brexit for Public Procurement Law and Policy in the United Kingdom, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 1; Christopher R. Yukins, Brexit and Procurement: A U.S. Perspective on the Way Ahead, 2017 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 71 (available on Westlaw). At the same time, protectionism on the European continent may be on the rise (see the accompanying piece by Dr. Pascal Friton, of Berlin), even as European states implements new EU procurement directives intended to facilitate cross-border trade (see the accompanying piece from Andrea Sundstrand, of Stockholm University).
The outlook for many international procurement markets is, in sum, grimmer than it has been in many years, although this adversity may bring new hope for alternative means --such as regulatory cooperation --to reduce inefficient barriers to trade. Part II of this piece will review the background to current developments in the United States. Part III will discuss the U.S. elections and the Trump administration's approach to international procurement, Part IV will discuss some of the Trump administration's policy options, and Part V will conclude by summarizing, in a rough matrix of costs and benefits, those options.
II. BACKGROUND: FREE TRADE AND PROCUREMENT
In modern economics, the working presumption for centuries (at least since Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations in 1776) has been that open markets across borders achieve optimal domestic welfare. That presumption drove U.S. policy after World War II, and led to U. In part as a result of those international agreements, which nurtured common legal norms as they opened procurement markets in the covered nations, procurement systems around the world generally evolved along parallel tracks, adopting similar solutions to common problems. While the United States, Canada and the European Union were leaders in this evolution (see the accompanying piece from Brenda Swick, on Canada's recent progress), developing nations joined the fold as they agreed to enter plurilateral free trade agreements (such as the WTO's Government Procurement Agreement (GPA)) and bilateral and regional free trade agreements (which typically include chapters on procurement).
These parallel developments touched both procurement law and trade. As channels of trade and communication opened, procurement regimes around the world assimilated common best practices (such as methods of procurement) and broadly accepted international norms (such as economic integration, sustainability, and anti-corruption 
Release, President-Elect Donald J. Trump Appoints Dr. Peter Navarro to Head the White House National Trade Council (Dec. 21,.2016) ("The mission of the National Trade Council will be to advise the President on innovative strategies in trade negotiations, coordinate with other agencies to assess U.S. manufacturing capabilities and the defense industrial base, and help match unemployed American workers with new opportunities in the skilled manufacturing sector. The National Trade Council will also lead the Buy America, Hire America program to ensure the President-elect's promise is fulfilled in government procurement and projects ranging from infrastructure to national defense.")
IV. OPTIONS FOR TRUMP TRADE POLICY IN PROCUREMENT
The Trump administration will have several options to consider, which carry different potential costs and benefits. Most of these options, it should be noted, could be exercised without new legislation. The list of options set forth here is not exhaustive, and it is possible that the Trump administration will consider, and follow, other protective strategies in procurement trade.
• Pressure Officials to "Buy American: Because imposing new domestic preferences could run afoul of existing trade obligations (discussed below), the simplest option might be for the Trump administration to admonish federal purchasers to "Buy American." Given the flexibility inherent in the competitive negotiations used for most significant federal procurement, it would be relatively easy to mask a general domestic preference that was not included in formal evaluation criteria. If it became clear that procurement officials were regularly weighing an unstated preference in their evaluations, however, foreign vendors might protest successfully that procurement officials were unlawfully applying an ad hoc (and discriminatory) socioeconomic criterion, without explicit statutory or regulatory authority. See, e.g., John Cibinic, Jr., Ralph C. Nash, Jr. & Christopher R. Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts 1572 (4 th ed. 2011) ("There is a view that collateral policies can be implemented only when authorized by statute. GAO has ruled that an executive agency needs a clear grant of authority from Congress to implement a collateral policy that limits those who are eligible for award of contracts." (citing authorities)). At the same time, a message to federal buyers that they should allow "Buy USA" preferences to override published evaluation criteria would undermine the rule of law in procurement, and could sour future U.S. efforts to open foreign procurement markets, as foreign governments (and purchasers) would be slow to forget perceived federal discrimination against foreign vendors.
• Ignore Free Trade Obligations Under Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements: Another strategy, related to the first, would be to admonish Pentagon buyers to "Buy American" despite the United States' commitment under reciprocal defense procurement agreements not to discriminate when buying defense materiel from the U.S. allies that have entered into these special agreements. (In 2016, Japan, Estonia and Slovenia joined the list of allies that have signed these memoranda of understanding between the U.S. Defense Department and its counterpart ministries of defense. See, e.g., http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procure-ment_memoranda_of_understanding.html.)
A strategy of dismantling the reciprocal defense procurement agreements could raise a thicket of legal, political and national security issues, however. While these reciprocal agreements (unlike the GPA and other free
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Int'l-2-4 trade agreements) do not explicitly afford foreign vendors rights to protest, and instead anticipate that nations will simply leave the agreements if they suffer discrimination, see, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 8304; Drew B. Miller, Is It Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 93 (2009) , affected foreign vendors from U.S. allies that suffered discrimination might try to protest under the implementing rules set forth in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, DFARS Subpart 225.4. Undercutting the reciprocal defense procurement agreements also could hurt U.S. firms by shutting off foreign defense markets, which generally are not opened by traditional trade agreements and which are important for U.S. exporters. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., Defense Markets Report, at 9 (June 2016), http://trade.gov/ topmarkets/pdf/Defense_Top_Markets_Report.pdf). Moreover, reciprocal defense procurement agreements are explicitly meant to nurture other foreign policy and national security goals, such as interoperability and mutual cooperation. Triggering a "trade war" in defense procurement thus could prove deeply counterproductive, both economically and for purposes of national security. Moreover, if the Trump administration hopes to make U.S. defense spending more efficient while at the same time strengthening U.S. national security, competition from allies' vendors may prove essential. Thus, a strategy of abandoning the reciprocal defense agreements (explicitly or implicitly), although relatively easy to implement, could raise serious costs and risks.
• Including "Buy American" Preferences with New Infrastructure Spending: A more likely course would be to include "Buy American" requirements in legislation authorizing new infrastructure spending --which was another important element of the Trump campaign. Infrastructure funding legislation regularly includes "Buy American" requirements for procurement done by grantees and federal agencies using the new funds; the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the "Recovery Act"), Pub This history suggests that a Buy American preference in an infrastructure bill, combined with an exclusion for existing U.S. obligations, could offer benefits at relatively low risk, though the higher costs and delays caused by the preference would be a continuing concern.
• Expanding Buy American Act Price Preference: Another strategy would be to expand the Buy American Act's price preference. The language of the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 8302, does not stipulate a price preference; instead, it states that, subject to certain exceptions, only "unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been mined or produced in the United States, and only manufactured articles, materials, and supplies that have been manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States, shall be acquired for public use unless the head of the department or independent establishment concerned determines their acquisition to be inconsistent with the public interest or their cost to be unreasonable." (Emphasis added.) As implemented, the Buy American Act preference therefore turns on the relative unreasonableness of a higher domestic price; if an offered domestic product is unreasonably expensive, the agency is to buy the cheaper foreign product. A general price preference (6 percent) was set by President Eisenhower under Executive Order 10582, Prescribing Uniform Procedures for Certain Determinations Under the Buy-American Act, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954) , and current regulations set a higher price preference (12 percent) when the next-lowest-priced item is offered by a small business, FAR 25.105(b) (2). In the Defense Department, DFARS 225.105 imposes a preference of 50 percent on purchases of defense items. (That much higher preference at the Defense Department is tempered by the reciprocal defense procurement agreements, discussed above, which sweep away Buy American barriers against foreign defense materiel from qualifying countries. See DFARS 252.225-7000 (Defense Department purchasers will "evaluate offers of qualifying country end products without regard to the restrictions of the Buy American statute")).
Given the breadth of the Buy American Act's language, the Trump administration might, for example, seek to increase the price preferences imposed under the Buy American Act regulations. Notably, the FAR already affords agencies the authority to set, by regulation, higher price preferences under the Act. FAR 25.105(a); see Kate M. Manuel, The Buy American Act --Preferences for " Domestic" Supplies: In Brief, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. R43140, at 2 & n.13 (Apr. 26, 2016) , https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ R43140.pdf.
While increasing the Buy American Act's price preference might gain political points, its economic benefits would be relatively unfocused across the market, and it would raise costs in the procurement system, see, e.g., Keith A. Hirschman, The Costs and Benefits of Maintaining the Buy American Act 57-61 (Naval Postgraduate School 1998) (reviewing literature on costs of Act's price preference), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/ fulltext/u2/a350159.pdf --something that candidate Trump said he did not want to do. Moreover, a more expansive interpretation of the Buy American Act generally would still apply only to smaller procurements, up to the thresholds (typically $191,000 for supplies, and $7.3 million for construction) above which trade agreements in effect override the Buy American Act. See FAR 25.402(b) (thresholds); FAR 25.001(b) ("The restrictions in the Buy American statute are not applicable in acquisitions subject to certain trade agreements."). In practice, therefore, increasing the price preference under the Buy American Act probably would create more market opportunities for the small U.S. businesses. that tend to focus on smaller, below-threshold procurements.
• Renegotiating Coverage Under Trade Agreements: It is unlikely that the Trump administration would decide to withdraw entirely from the Government Procurement Agreement under Article XX of the agreement, since leaving the GPA could close off valuable market access abroad for U.S. exporters. Another option would be to try to reduce the scope of the U.S. procurement market available under the GPA. Were the Trump administration to reduce coverage, however, it would likely trigger protracted negotiations under Article IX of the GPA, and, if those negotiations proved unsuccessful, a challenge and potentially reciprocal reductions of access by other nations could follow --a slowly unfolding "trade war" in procurement, in other words.
• Stalling Accessions to the GPA and Other Free Trade Agreements: A final option would be to slow the accession of China and other lowcost producers to the GPA, because by joining the GPA those countries would gain broad access to the U.S. procurement market. While delaying Chinese accession would not, in itself, reap significant political benefits for the Trump administration, since China's accession process has already been pending for nearly a decade, see, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, What are the prospects for
concluding work on China's GPA accession in 2015 ?, 2015 , the flip --allowing China to join --could be seen as a serious reversal for the Trump administration.
Some of the options discussed above raise risks of challenge under current trade agreements, either through a bid protest brought by a foreign vendor or through a government-to-government dispute brought under the GPA. Although the GPA explicitly provides for bid protests by vendors to enforce the agreement's requirements, potential vendor bid protests on those grounds in the U.S. system were affected by a recent series of decisions before the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Per Aarsleff a/s et al., Comp. Gen. B-410782 (Feb. 18, 2015) The foreign vendors in the Per Aarsleff cases challenged the U.S. government's failure to honor an international agreement which assured Denmark that only Danish or Greenlandic firms would be awarded support contracts at Thule Air Base, in Greenland. The GAO decision explicitly bypassed the issues presented by the international agreement, focusing instead on the terms of the solicitation, id. at 7 & n.8, and the Justice Department, in defending the subsequent protest before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, 121 Fed. Cl. at 621, and on the appeal before the Federal Circuit, see Brief for Defendant-Appellant United States, Per Aarsleff v. United States, Fed. Cir. No. 2015 -5111, at 47 (Sept. 29, 2015 , argued that because the Court of Federal Claims is barred by 28 U.S.C. §1502 from hearing "claims" based on "treaties," the Court of Federal Claims is similarly barred from hearing bid protests based upon international executive agreements. (The GPA and other free trade agreements are considered executive agreements. See, e.g., Jane M. Smith et al., Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as CongressionalExecutive Agreements, Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. 97-896 (Apr. 15, 2013) , https://fas. org/sgp/crs/misc/97-896.pdf. The Court of Federal Claims did not disagree with the government's argument that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a bid protest grounded in an international agreement, 121 Fed. Cl. at 622, though the court ultimately ruled on other grounds, and the Federal Circuit did not address the issue.
As a result of the Per Aarsleff decisions, foreign vendors may conclude that enforcing an international trade agreement --fighting discrimination in procurement --through the standard U.S. bid protest process is simply too difficult. If that happens, questions raised by the Trump administration's trade initiatives in procurement would need to be resolved under the GPA's government-to-government disputes process --a much more cumbersome process, and one that may further aggravate relations with the United States' allies and trading partners.
V. CONCLUSION: ASSESSING RISKS AND BENEFITS
Taking the various benefits and risks discussed above into account, it appears that the Trump administration faces an array of options, with differing risks and perceived benefits:
